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I. INTRODUCTION
Communications networks are traditionally con-
structed from hardware dedicated to specific tasks, us-
ing data handling rules implemented within the firmware.
Naturally, this is a relatively inflexible model and, in an
effort to improve key metrics such as scalability, there has
been significant drive towards the development of soft-
ware defined networks (SDNs). The underlying premise
of an SDN is that the rules are deployed as software mod-
ules instead of being hardcoded, separating the control
and forwarding plane, so as to allow global reconfigura-
bility of the network from a single location as and when
required. This also makes it easier to merge multiple
disparate networks, bypassing any compatibility issues
between proprietary architectures [1].
For quantum key distribution (QKD) to be useful
in the real world, it must be compatible with next-
generation communications models. Data centres are
ideal for demonstrating this capabability, as they can
benefit greatly from the adoption of SDNs [2]. Addi-
tionally, virtual network functions (VNFs), which run on
generic servers and complement SDNs, can be used to
instantiate critical services such as firewalls [3]. How-
ever, this requires high levels of security during their de-
ployment via communication channels. For amplifier-free
data centre networks spanning distances of up to 10 km,
the operational wavelength is 1310 nm [4], increasing the
potential for commercial 1550 nm QKD devices to be
multiplexed with pre-existing technologies straight out
of the box.
Here, we have run experiments emulating how QKD
can fit into this environment with minimal disruption to
the classical setup. We have particularly emphasised the
ability for QKD pairings to be established between differ-
ent endpoints on a flexible basis, either in the context of a
standard network, or in scenarios where there is an asym-
metric number of Alices and Bobs. This work will be ex-
tended to secure the Bristol Is Open metropolitan-scale
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FIG. 1. The Bristol Is Open metropolitan network, with
which a city centre quantum backbone will be integrated.
This will serve as the endpoint of a UK quantum network,
initially extending across the south of England.
SDN (see Figure 1), which relies on the distribution of
VNFs in order to maintain a versatile infrastructure [5],
and will act as the endpoint for a UK quantum backbone.
II. THE EMULATOR
Before any device is installed on a third-party network,
there must be sufficient evidence that this will not intro-
duce security holes or performance issues. To test the
compatibility of both new and well-developed quantum
technologies with SDNs, we have built an experimental
emulator modelled on a Bristol is Open node (see Fig-
ure 2). An optical switch with 192x192 ports is central
to reconfiguring SDNs and, when set up to route the light
through spools of fibre (ITU-T G.652), allows the emu-
lator to represent multiple nodes in a network with an
arbitrary topology.
To begin with, we ran commercial ID Quantique
2FIG. 2. Physical setup of the emulator, based on a Bris-
tol Is Open node. The servers have data storage, software
encryption and data transmission capabilities, drawing key
from the QKD controller. The SDN controller communicates
using OpenFlow messages through OpenDaylight. For this
series of experiments, d1, d2 and d3 are 4.5 km, 15 km and 25
km respectively.
Clavis2 systems alongside 1310 nm classical light trans-
mitting quantum-keyed AES-encrypted VNFs. We char-
acterised cross-talk at the quantum level within the
switch, and found it does not noticeably affect key gen-
eration. Using a time scheduler, we also shared a single
Bob between multiple emulated Alices, paving the way
for deployment in a real network where devices need to
be able to communicate with more than one peer, and
introducing an asymmetric topology which reduces the
number of QKD devices in the field. Authentication re-
lies on an initial secret key stored on the QKD Controller,
which can be overwritten prior to a new link being estab-
lished. This enables partner swapping without the mod-
ification of any device-specific software. Our long-term
goal is to establish a complete framework for hardware-
agnostic SDN-compatible QKD with quantum resource
sharing protocols, and the results presented herein com-
prise our initial steps towards this.
III. RESULTS
For the maximum range (10 km) of a 1310 nm data
centre network, we have found a QBER of 1.97± 0.81 %
and a secret key rate of 1.77 ± 0.22 kbits/s, both aver-
aged over 20 key generation instances. It should be noted
that a 10 km fibre was unavailable at the time of writ-
ing, so this figure was calculated through interpolation of
experimental data ranging from 0 to 25km of SMF fibre.
Future work will include the installation of variable at-
tenuators, allowing direct measurement of loss-dependent
parameters across any simulated fibre length.
FIG. 3. Average initialisation time of the ID Quantique
Clavis2 QKD devices over different lengths of fibre. Each
pass through the optical switch contributes 1 dB of loss, re-
sulting in an extra 2 dB of attenuation across all cases. Fibre
imperfections mean the attenuation does not scale linearly
with distance.
Figure 3 shows the average initialisation time for the
Clavis2 systems over a range of fibre lengths. This is
the time taken for the first key to be generated, once
the QKD controller has received a command to open a
quantum channel. It should be noted that this will have
a greater impact on the average secret key rate in set-
tings where Bob is time-shared due to limitations on the
availability of hardware, as each QKD link is likely to
remain open for less time than in a standard network.
This can be quantified by considering how the optimum
distance for balancing variation in secret key rate with
absolute value, changes depending on the number of key
generation instances.
Finally, we found that transmitting the same data us-
ing SFTP took 1.38 ± 0.05 times as long as encrypting
with quantum-keyed AES and sending it via a standard
socket. Based on both this and the average initialisation
time of the system, we can calculate the minimum VNF
size at which QKD-based encryption becomes compara-
ble in speed to SFTP.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have shown that it is possible to inte-
grate QKD in a next-generation networked environment,
representative of the real world. Commercial QKD de-
vices can function within normal parameters alongside
equipment which is central to an SDN, and are not re-
stricted to static pairings. This is a crucial milestone in
the effort to use QKD for data security on a massive scale,
reducing the need for radical changes to pre-established
architectures, which would otherwise prevent its adop-
tion. Future work will involve expanding the SDN inter-
faces to control in-house and commercial QKD systems,
as well as encrypting the control signals for both SDNs
3and VNF distribution. QKD may be a practical solu-
tion for rekeying network functions, and we will examine
the best way in which it can be treated as a resource for
underlying control systems or end users. Finally, the em-
ulator will undergo further development, to reach a point
where it can be used as an arbitrary network testbed for
any quantum device. We envisage that QKD can have
a signficant impact on networks of the future, through
encryption of the control, orchestration and data chan-
nels. In particular, communications which are critical to
network infrastructures need to be highly secure and can
tolerate lower key rates compared to many other appli-
cations. For this, QKD would be ideal.
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